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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
THE IMPACT OF FOOD RECALL ON THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION
ADOPTION
Food safety problems have gained national attention, and food recall is one of
the most important indications of this concern. Third-party certifications have become
a popular way to improve the safety and quality of products for consumers.
Publications related to third-party certification usually focus on the motives and
benefits of a particular certification. However, to date, no existing research
investigates the effects of food recalls on certification adoption.
This study uses probit models with a binary endogenous explanatory variable
to examine the relationship between food recalls and third-party certification, based
on recalls occurring between January 1, 2015 and February 18, 2016. Marginal effects
are used to interpret the impact of recalls and companies’ annual net sales on thirdparty certification adoption. Results reveal that past recalls significantly effect a
firm’s likelihood of certification adoption.
KEYWORDS: Food recall, Third-party certifications, Probit model, Binary
endogenous explanatory, Marginal effect.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades, food safety concerns have grown significantly around
the world due to the increasing incidence of food-related safety issues. The risk of
foodborne illness is the most notable of these issues and, with nearly a quarter of the
U.S. population currently highly at risk of contracting such an illness (Oliver et al.,
2005), numerous meat recalls occur due to possible foodborne illnesses each year.
From 2000 to 2007, in the United States alone, it is estimated that about 47.8 million
people per year become ill as a direct result of 31 known foodborne illness (FoodNet
data). To ensure food safety and prevent illnesses and deaths related to foodborne
pathogens, facilities adopt various methods to more efficiently and safely
manufacture, process, pack, and store food. One such method is the adoption of thirdparty certification, which can help a company develop a detailed scheme to identify
any problems in the way they make, pack, or store their products that could be
hazardous to consumers.
In recent years, major food safety events involving ground beef, ground
turkey, egg, peanut butter, and spinach have resulted in thousands of illnesses,
widespread media attention and hundreds of product recalls. Food recalls, as strong
indicators of food safety problems, occur regularly for many reasons. The most
dangerous and widely noted is microbiologic contamination, which can cause
foodborne illnesses. An standard example of a food recall occured on July 3, 2015;
according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection
Service. Denver’s Lombardi Brothers Meats issued a recall of approximately 26,975
pounds of tenderized steak and ground beef products. These products may have been
1

contaminated with E. coli O157:H7, and they had ben distributed to local hotels,
restaurants and institutional customers throughout the southern and western United
States. The company’s sampling program received a positive E. coli test result on
June 30 from a sample collected from the same source as the product already sold to
the public. Due to the quick response, FSIS and the company received no reports of
illnesses related to the consumption of these products. As this example shows, food
recall is an important tool in responding to contamination incidents. However, when a
company issues a recall, their reputation as well as consumer loyalty and intention to
purchase is threatened. Individuals’ willingness to pay decreases as a result of these
foodborne illnesses. How companies can regain consumer confidence after incidents
of food recall then becomes an important question.
As companies try to maintain their reputations for producing safe products, an
important way for firms and plants to ensure controlled food safety processes is by
obtaining third-party certification (TPC). TPC, as a governance mechanism, is
becoming a popular component of the global agro-food system and is being accepted
by larger consumers and retailers. Companies benefit by implementing TPC as a tool
to monitor and enforce standards for food quality and safety (Hatanaka et al., 2008).
Consumers’ willingness to pay higher prices for certified products reflects their
concern about food safety issues (Rozan et al., 2004). Certification standards are also
implemented in order to regain consumer trust in product safety.
Governments and administrative offices devise and implement national-level
food legislation and technical requirements for food processing, handling, and
production processes. These laws and requirements provide incentives for firms to
adopt appropriate production processes and methods. In addition to incentives driven
2

by food and liability law, retailers, such as the SQF certification and Primus GFS, are
also a major source for other motives that encourage firms to go beyond the basic
adoption of approved practices meeting government requirements towards the
adoption of third-party certification to meet market demand. These motives can be
classified as either internal or external incentives for third-party certification adoption.
Internal incentives are synonymous with internal forces that push the organization to
seek TPC; they can be associated either with managerial performance (i.e. improving
communication between the organization’s employees) or with operational
performance (i.e. improving the organization’s quality system), both of which are
directly affected by adoption. External incentives are largely related to motives
associated with a company’s external environment, such as customers, competitors,
suppliers, and the government. The term “external environment” refers to elements
that are outside an organization but still have the potential to affect all or part of it
(Zaramdini, 2007). Although some research has looked at whether TPC is necessary
and what motivates a company to apply for a particular certification, little is known,
however, about the relationship between a company issuing a food recall and TPC
adoption. This paper discusses how food recalls impact TPC, as well as which recall
factor is most influential on TPC adoption.
Additionally, this paper contributes to the existing literature from several
perspectives. Firstly, we have constructed a comprehensive dataset for recall
information in the U.S. for the period of January 1, 2015 to February 18, 2016; this
dataset provides an overview of all recall-related information occurring within this
period. Secondly, we searched through each company’s TPC adoption history. Six
global third-party food safety certifications considered, all of which are recognized
3

and popular around the world. Thirdly, we tested the effects of recall on TPC
adoption, the results of which strongly support the real effects of food recall activities
on TPC adoption. Lastly, we present an initial exploration of food recall as a TPC
motivator; these findings may thus provide useful insights on the subject.

4

CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND
Although the United States enjoys one of the world’s safest food and water
supplies, it still sees 76 million cases of foodborne illness each year, leading to
billions of dollars in damages, unnecessary suffering, and nearly 5,000 deaths. The
salmonella outbreak in 2008, caused by peanut butter manufactured by the Peanut
Corporation of America, killed nine people and sickened 714 others across 46 states.
In another example, the recall of over a half billion fresh eggs from Wright County
Egg and Hillandale Farms resulted in heightened food safety problems and media
coverage of food recalls that drew direct public attention. Foodborne illnesses, which
are caused by 15 major pathogens, cost 1.9 billion dollars in 2013 alone (ERS). For
meat and poultry recalls, the weight recalled increased from 6 million pounds in 1988
to 21 million pounds in 2015. Figure 2.1 shows the change in the number of recalls
from 1994 to 2015.
Figure 2.1 Numbers of Meat and Poultry Recalls from 1994 to 2015
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Since early this century, third-party certification has played a significant role
in the global food-safety system. More companies have begun to select TPC, which is
increasingly viewed as a tool for gaining a competitive advantage. Certifications
chosen for study in this paper are leading and popular standards around the world; the
aim of these certifications is to guarantee the standardization of quality, safety, and
operational criteria, to ensure that manufacturers fulfill their legal obligations, and to
provide protection for consumers. By jointly discussing recalls from within the last
year and six TPC standards, this paper focuses on the implications of food recalls on
TPC adoption.

2.1 Background information: Food Recall Statistics
Food recalls are currently quite common. They are used as a means for
improving food safety by removing faulty products from markets. If foods enter the
market with the potential to cause serious adverse health effects, companies and
government regulators will recall these products. There have been over 600 recalls in
the U.S. and Canada in the past 12 months. Of these, 150 involved meat, poultry, egg,
and mixed 1 products and were regulated by the Food Safety and Inspection Service
(FSIS), a branch of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). As shown
in Figure 2.2, poultry meat was recalled in the largest quantity in 2011. One reason
for this difference was food producer and marketer Cargill issued a recall of 36
million pounds of ground turkey because it may have been contaminated with a drug-

1

"Mixed" refers to cases in which more than one type of meat or poultry species is included.
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resistant strain of salmonella. And in 2014, beef was recalled far more than poultry or
mixed meat products for a California-based Rancho Feeding Corporation was solely
responsible for a recall of approximately 8,742,700 pounds of beef product: the
company had processed diseased and unsound animals and had done so without the
benefit or full benefit of a federal inspection. Products had then been shipped to
distribution centers and retail establishments in California, Florida, Illinois, Oregon,
Texas, and Washington. Both of these two cases were a Class I food recall case.
Figure 2.2 Recalled Weights by Species from 2011 to 2015
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Depending on the degree of the health hazard posed, food recalls can be
organized into three different classes, defined by the USDA as follows:
Class I – involving a health hazard situation in which there is a reasonable probability
that eating the food will cause health problems or death;
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Class II –involving a potential health hazard situation in which there is
a remote probability of adverse health consequences from eating the food; and
Class III –involving a situation in which eating the food will not cause adverse health
consequences.
As we can see from the above the definition, a Class I recall refers to
dangerous or defective products that could predictably cause serious health problems
or even death. However, as shown in Figure 2.3, the majority of recall cases from
2012 to 2015 were Class I, a rate which is still gradually increasing each year. For this
reason, I have chosen to focus on Class I cases in this paper.
Figure 2.3 Recalled Cases by Class from 2011 to 2015
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Besides class differences, food recalls are also caused by different reasons and
pose differing hazards to people’s health. For example, according to the FSIS annual
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summary, recalls can be caused by STEC 2, Listeria monocytogenes, Salmonella,
undeclared allergens, extraneous materials, processing defects, undeclared substances,
and other reasons. As shown in Figure 2.4, the presence of an undeclared allergen was
always the most common recall reason from 2011 to 2015. In addition to foodborne
illnesses, allergens are another significant threat to human health, not only for the 15
million Americans who suffer from food allergies but also for the food manufacturers
that produce the foods we eat (Maberry, 2016).
Certainly, the reasons behind each individual recall are more complicated than
what is reflected in the annual summary above. For ease of demonstration in this
study, however, recall reasons are classified into two main groups. Reason 1 is for
products that are misbranded and/or include undeclared allergens, are produced
without the benefit of federal inspection and/or do not have a federal mark of
inspection or were not presented at the U.S. point of entry for inspection. Reason 2
designates products that may be contaminated with extraneous materials or
adulterated with a pathogen such as E. coli, Listeria monocytogenes or Salmonella. In
2015, most recalls were the result of operational mistakes, such as incorrect labeling
or the presence of an undeclared ingredient, classed as Reason 1. Although cases with
biological causes included in Reason 2, such as the detection of Listeria, Salmonella,
and E. coli, appear in weak proportion compared to the overall number of cases, as
shown in Table 2.1, they can still cause incidents of foodborne illness. In this paper, I

2

"STEC" includes recalls due to Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC). STEC organisms include E.

coli O157:H7, E. coli O26, E. coli O45, E. coliO103, E. coli O111, E. coli O121, and E. coli O145.
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stress the importance of research on how TPC is impacted by foodborne illness
recalls, those falling into Reason group 2.
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Figure 2.4 Number of Recalls by Reason from 2011 to 2015
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Table 2.1 Reason Groups in Study Period
Reason Group

Frequency

Percent

Reason 1

219

90.87%

Reason 2

22

9.13%

2.2 Background information: Third-Party Certification
With an increase in the number of food recalls resulting from the appearance
of many foodborne diseases, such as mad cow disease, foot-and-mouth disease, and
microbial contamination of fresh produce, consumer confidence in food safety has
declined greatly. There are more than 200 known diseases transmitted through food
by a variety of agents that include bacteria, fungi, viruses, and parasites. Consumers’
growing concerns regarding the quality and traceability of products and processes call
for fundamentally new ways of developing, producing and marketing products,
thereby also driving the use of TPC.
Traditionally, the monitoring of food safety and quality standards was the
responsibility of government agencies. To solve food safety problems, U.S. federal
agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug
Administration, developed standards and conducted inspections to ensure food safety
and other production conditions. Results of this approach, however, have been far
from ideal. Simultaneous demands on the food retail industry and the improvement of
private retailer standards have shifted the responsibility for this task to third-party
certification (Hatanaka et al., 2005).
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As a result, third-party certifications (TPC) are increasingly viewed as tools
for gaining a competitive advantage. The growing number of companies pursuing
TPC reflects a broader shift from public to private governance. Certifications provide
market signals concerning food quality claims. Successful third-party certifications
assure buyers of food quality and reduce the potential for market failure that might
otherwise occur when information about food quality is uncertain and asymmetrically
distributed.
There has been an increasing number of standards devoted to the promotion of
food safety. From the ensemble of food safety certifications, the following six thirdparty certifications were chosen to be focused on in this paper: the British Retail
Consortium’s Global Food Safety Standard (BRC); the Safe Quality Food
certification (SQF); Primus GFS; Food Safety System Certification 22000 (FSSC
22000); Global Good Agricultural Practice (G.A.P.); and the International
Organization of Standardization (ISO) 22000 certification. All are leading and
globally-recognized food safety certifications. Companies possessing these
certifications are seen as presenting a competitive advantage. The six TPCs are
introduced below:
1. The BRC Standard was originally developed by a trade agency in the UK. It
is now a leading safety and quality certification program and a basic requirement for
leading retailers, used by over 23,000 certificated suppliers in 123 countries and even
adopted by suppliers not selling into the UK mark, sites in the United States alone.
2. The SQF certification, established by the SQF Institute (SQFI), presents
another third-party entity. Each SQF standard can be achieved at three different levels
– Level 2 is approved by the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI, an influential non13

profit organization that benchmarks food safety standards) – which link primary
production certification to food manufacturing, distribution and agent/broker
management certification. It is recognized by retailers and foodservice providers
around the world and has 5,301 sites in the United States. Administered by the Food
Marketing Institute (FMI), SQF is now the only scheme to integrate a quality
component as well as food safety.
3. Primus GFS is a Global Food Safety Initiative and globally-recognized
private scheme that establishes food safety requirements for the certification of
agricultural produce designated for human consumption in their fresh or minimallyprocessed state. This standard defines three fundamental areas that must be
considered by a company in the agricultural sector when producing or manufacturing
their products: a Food Safety Management System, Good Agricultural and/or
Manufacturing Practices (one or both), and the HACCP System. There are currently
five certification bodies and one provisionally approved certification body in the
United States, four of which are located in California.
4. The FSSC 22000 Food Safety System Certification provides a framework
for effectively managing an organization's food safety responsibilities. It is also fully
recognized by the Global Food Safety Initiative and is based on existing ISO
Standards. It demonstrates that a company has a robust Food Safety Management
System in place that meets the requirements of consumers. Already, more than ten
thousand organizations in over 140 countries have achieved FSSC 22000 certification.
There are currently more than one hundred licensed certification bodies and over
1,500 auditors worldwide, with 12,043 companies in the United States holding valid
certificates from FSSC22000.
14

5. Global G.A.P. is the world's leading farm assurance program, translating
consumer requirements into Good Agricultural Practices. Through a growing number
of producers and retailers from around the world, the European organization has
gained global significance and is currently adopted by 160,000 producers under
certification in 124 countries. It began in 1997 as EUREPGAP, an initiative by
retailers belonging to the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group, which was started
when British retailers working with supermarkets in continental Europe became
aware of consumers’ growing concerns regarding food safety and traceability,
environmental sustainability, worker health and safety, and animal welfare. It now has
eight approved certification bodies in the United States.
6. ISO 22000 certification is an international standard that defines the
requirements of a food safety management system for food safety and hygiene
covering all organizations in the food chain and developed by the International
Organization for Standardization. This standard was created from the very successful
quality management system standard ISO 9001, which is used worldwide by over
700,000 companies. In response to the need for an international standard for the food
industry, ISO developed a Food Safety Management System, which encourages the
harmonization of the many existing national and private standards and elaborates on
the management systems approach of ISO 9001. Based on a changing focus to food
safety management and an incorporation of PRP and HACCP principles, the ISO
22000 currenly counts 92 registered companies in the United States.

15

CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 History and Development of TPCs
As an important method for of market governance, independent third-party
certifications have developed extremely rapidly in recent years and have made a
significant contribution towards the improvement of food safety in many fields.
Acting on a particular set of standards and compliance methods, third-party
certifications are provided by private or public organizations responsible for
accessing, evaluating, and certifying safety and quality claims (Deaton, 2004).
Historically, government agencies, such as the USDA in the United States, were
responsible for establishing food safety standards. However, private safety standards
and certification programs are responding to higher consumer requirements, needs for
safety controls throughout the vertical chain of distribution. Thus these
responsibilities are now increasingly being shifted to third-party certification bodies,
which promote the emergence and development of third-party certification as a
regulatory mechanism in the global agro-food system (Tanner 2000), especially as
global food trade expands dramatically and provides consumers with access to a
wider variety of foods all year long.
Worldwide adoption of TPCs results from collaborations between the world’s
leading food companies, from retailers and manufacturers to food service sector
agents and service providers active in the food supply chain. Since food safety is of
major importance in international trade, cooperation and coordination in the
development and implementation of TPC throughout the supply chain has been
marked by a new sense of urgency and focus. The primary goals of TPCs are to
16

provide consistency and cost efficiency, reduce duplication, increase confidence and
ensure that the global supply chain is safe for consumers.

3.2 Structure and Characteristics of TPCs
Most certification systems employ very similar structures (see Figure 3.1). A
certification body is monitored by the system owner and accredited by an
accreditation body to ensure its ability to provide supplier certification. A certified
supplier offers customers a qualified product or service which complies with the
system owners’ standards.
Figure 3.1 Basic Structure of Certification System

Source: Jahn et al., 2005
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, certification bodies are independent from other
participants in the supply chain as well as from the scheme owner. This structure
distinguishes TPCs from other product safety and quality certification mechanisms
(Zuckerman 1996; Tanner 2000; Golan et al. 2001) and, as certification body
managers and scheme owners retain independence from each other, the food industry
17

can be confident that impartiality is maintained during any audit and between
certification bodies. Certification bodies can then be viewed as objective arbitrators of
product safety and quality (Fagan 2003). In other words, the ‘independence’ of
certification bodies is the basis of TPCs’ legality and effectiveness. Besides
independence, most TPCs are similar to one another in many ways. Their main
purpose is to protect consumer health with integrated food safety management,
fulfilled through specifying the basic requirements acceptable for food safety and
third-party audits. At the same time, the main differences between food safety
standards are that they are owned by different organizations in different regions and
that they deal with different stages of production in the value chain (i.e., farming
versus manufacturing).

3.3 Certification Process
The certification process for BRC, Primus GFS, Global G.A.P. and SQF are
similar, often consisting of five steps in a one-year period, as shown in Figure 3.2 and
described below.
Step A – According to the firm’s size and nature, the certification body presents the
manufacturers with a proposal. When the proposal is accepted, the audit process can
proceed.
Step B – There is often an optional ‘pre-audit’ stage before the formal audit, which is
useful in identifying any shortcomings in management systems or in the plant’s
facilities.
Step C - The formal audit is an onsite audit. All site areas are assessed to determine
compliance with each clause of the standard. Concerns or observed non-conformities
18

will be issued in this two-week stage as a pre-report and, at the end of the audit,
organizations will receive a corrective action report identifying final observed nonconformities. The certifying entity provides the organization with another two weeks
to respond to the corrective action report. These non-conformities must be rectified
and documented with evidence or through an on-site visit. Once the non-conformities
have been corrected and the auditor has accepted the evidence, an independent
technical review of the audit is conducted by an authorized certification manager, who
approves the issuance of a certificate.
Step D – Most certifications are only valid for one year. Thus, a full recertification
audit is scheduled for every twelve-months. The audit is a full re-audit conducted in
the same way as the initial audit, where the implementation of the action plan is also
reviewed. Earlier non-conformity records are checked.
FSSC 22000 & ISO 22000 certifications are often valid for three years since
surveillance visits are scheduled twice a year and five times in two years. During the
visits, auditors review the implementation of the action plan, addressing past nonconformities and examining whether certain mandatory and other selected parts of the
system are in line with a provided audit plan.
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Figure 3.2 The Basic Certification Process
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after
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Source: www.SGS.com

3.4 Motives for and Benefits of TPCs
Meeting third-party certifications often entails significant expenses imposed
on producers, which can pose a significant economic burden for smallholders. Why
do companies and farms keep seeking third-party food safety certification? Very little
theoretical research exists which focuses on the motives behind seeking third-party
certification, and none has focused on the impact of recalls on certification. From an
empirical perspective as well, no research has explored the relationship between thirdparty certification and food recalls.
Since the market for agro-food products is becoming increasingly competitive,
TPC can help suppliers remain in the marketplace, and even expand their market
share, by allowing them to demonstrate to their customers that they have met
necessary standards. One of the defining purposes of TPC, particularly as it relates to
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food safety, is an increasing focus on the processes by which food is produced
(Henson, Spencer, & Humphrey, 2009), extending into how food is produced,
transported or processed. Through the adoption of TPCs, food firms are able to make
better management decisions, thereby improving productivity, efficiency, and product
and service quality, reducing incidents, rejections and complaints, and improving the
organization’s public image (Zaramdini, 2007). On the one hand, companies and
farms benefit from seeking certification as a means of demonstrating compliance with
legal and industry food safety requirements. On the other hand, TPCs promote
customer confidence and market access. The Consumer Goods Forum, GFSI, shows
that certified companies enjoy higher margins through efficiency savings resulting
from the application of TPC-defined regulations and that they are also able to prove
the consistency of their respective processes internationally, which in turn promotes
international trade.
The number of food recalls in the U.S. has shown a dramatic rise in the last
few years, increasing by about 50% from 2011 to 2015. Food recalls directly cost a
food company millions of dollars, in addition to indirect brand damage and lost sales.
Shiptsova et al. (2002) developed an equation to calculate recall cost, shown below
(3.1):
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 3 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃

(3.1)

× 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

After apologizing, removing the product from store shelves and away from consumers
as quickly as possible, and, in the process, spending a large amount of money, many
companies are not able to survive. To continue business and earn back their
reputation, the recalling company has to improve product quality, reduce incidents
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and complaints, and improve the organization’s public image – which is exactly what
TPCs offer. TPCs establish a series of requirements for managing production,
handling, processing, and storing operations, thereby ensuring the consumer’s safety
in each productive stage. These motives encourage recalling companies to apply for
TPC.
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CHAPTER 4 DATA
The data collected for this study dates from early 2015 to February 18, 2016.
The complete data set includes recall variables, companies’ yearly net sales, and the
number of recalls from 2009 to 2013 for a total of 241 observations. The data used in
this study can be divided into three main groups.
The first group is composed of recall information collected from the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS),
which includes data on both active and completed recalls. The FSIS provides an
annual summary of recalls involving meat and meat products each year. Between
January 1, 2015 to February 18, 2016, the FSIS reported 150 meat recalls, involving
over 21.1 million pounds of product. These figures show an increase from 94 recalls
and 18.7 million pounds of product in 2014. Among the 150 cases in 2015, 99 of them
were classified as Class I, which involves a serious health hazard. Additionally, over
1.7 million pounds of product were recalled, due to their potentially having been
contaminated with extraneous materials or adulterated with a pathogen such as E.
coli, Listeria monocytogenes or Salmonella, which, in this study, is classified as recall
reason 2.
The second group includes company information containing employee
numbers and net sales amounts for all companies. These data were collected from the
website LexisNexis Academic. Yearly financial net sales come from WorldBase in
U.S. dollars, from March 4, 2014. Access to company-level data allows for more
variability, enabling a more efficient estimation for controlling for the different
individual company sizes, which is a significant advantage of this analysis. From
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Figure 4.1, it is easy to see that companies currently experiencing recalls and
companies holding a certification both have higher annual net sales.
The third group looks at whether a subject is certified by either the BRC food
safety certification, the Primus GFS, the FSSC22000, the Safe Quality Food (SQF)
certification, the Global G.A.P. certification, or the ISO22000 certification. These six
certifications are independent third-party certifications and require renewal on
an annual basis. Since their websites only cite companies that are currently certified,
detailed information on when a company registered their certification for the first time
(certification history) was not available to us. Figure 4.2 shows that 44% of
observations in this data set have neither food recall nor TPC. For those with
certification, the proportion of having a recall and not having a recall during the study
period are nearly the same. Only 11% of companies issued recalls are not third-party
certified.
In this study, data from 241 companies are collected, including 84 companies
with recalls and 160 companies without, from the beginning of 2015 to February 18,
2016. Since these companies are primarily engaged in processing, preserving,
assembly cutting, packing, slaughtering and preparing meat and meat products from
purchased meats, they fall under the jurisdiction of NAICS 3 codes 311611 4 and
311612 5 lists. There are 4578 companies under these two lists in total. As
comparison, 160 companies without food recalls in the study period are randomly

3

The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS is the standard used by Federal
statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and
publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy.
4
Industry 311611 includes establishments that slaughter and processing meats (except poultry).
5
Industry 311612 includes establishments primarily engaged in assembly cutting and packing of
carcasses.
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selected from NAICS codes 311611 and 311612 lists. Data were collected from all
companies, including the company name, whether or not the company had a food
recall within the study period, recall history from 2009 to 2014, employee numbers,
and net sales. For companies with recall cases within the study period, recall
information is also collected, such as recall class, reason and quantity.
The above data are sufficient to answer the research question in this study. We
use a probit regression containing a single binary endogenous explanatory variable
(one instrument is used) and one exogenous explanatory variable. The dependent
variable in this study is whether or not the company is certified, while the independent
variables are RECALL, BEFORE, SALES, CLASS1, and REASON2 across all three
models. We grouped these explanatory variables together to create dummy variables,
and set BEFORE as the instrumental variable. Table 4.1 shows the explanations of
dummy variables and Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics.
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Figure 4.1 Means of Sales by Different Groups
(Unit: in million dollars)
Means of Sales
501.32

232.16

6.10

recall=1

recall=0

certificate=1

8.45

certificate=0

Source: FSIS, USDA
Figure 4.2 Percentage of Certification Adoption with Recent Recalls

22%
44%

norecall, no cert
recall, no cert
recall, cert=1

norecall, cert=1

23%
11%

Source: FSIS, USDA
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Table 4. 1 Dummy Variables
Variable

Explanation

CERTIFICATION

Whether the firm adopt a TPC in 2016

BEFORE (IV)

Number of firm’s recall from 2009 to
2014

RECALL

Whether has recall from January 1, 2015
to February 18, 2016
*takes the value of 1 when recall
happened in this period and 0 otherwise

CLASS1

Recall class
*takes the value of 1 when has recall in
Class I and 0 otherwise

REASON2

Recall reason
*takes the value of 1 when has recall
reason in group 2 and 0 otherwise
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics (N=241)

Sales

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

81918191.97

734587642.00

30000.00

9316256000

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative

Cumulative

Frequency

Percent

Recall
0

160

66.39

160

66.39

1

81

33.61

241

100.00

0

194

80.50

194

80.50

1

47

19.50

241

100.00

0

219

90.87

219

90.87

1

22

9.13

241

100.00

0

205

85.06

205

85.06

1

36

14.94

241

100.00

0

228

94.61

228

94.61

1

9

3.73

237

98.34

2

3

1.24

240

99.59

7

1

0.41

241

100.00

Class1

Reason2

Certification

Before
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CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Many factors influence a company’s decision to apply for TPC, including
meeting consumer requirements, improving product quality, achieving international
quality recognition, etc. More producers, co-manufacturers, and re-packers are
looking to TPC programs to assist them in meeting government regulatory
requirements. In addition, many retailers and food service providers also request that
their suppliers become certified by TPC. Companies that currently have recall issues
are more likely to rely on TPC to save their public image and improve their perceived
product quality. To establish the relationship between food recall and the probability
that a company becomes certified, probit analysis is most appropriate when estimating
the effects of one or more independent variables on a binary dependent variable.

5.1 Binary Probit Model
The probit analysis model is a type of generalized linear model that extends
the linear regression model by linking the range of real numbers to the 0-1 range.
When the dependent variable is binary, especially in the case of modeling
probabilities extremely close to 0 or 1, a probit regression is used instead of Ordinary
least squares (OLS). OLS regression is improper when the dependent variable is
discrete (Collett, 1991; Agresti, 1990). It is very important to report robust standard
errors because of the intrinsic heteroscedasticity of the linear probability model. A
probit model is a rapid method for computing maximum likelihood estimates (Bliss,
1934), and it is the basis for the final models in our paper.
Consider the existence of an unobserved continuous variable, Z, which can be
understood as the “propensity towards” the event of interest. In our case, Z represents
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a firm’s tendency to obtain certification. Mathematically, the relationship between Z
and the probability of response is:
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐 + (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐹𝐹(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 )

where

(5.1)

𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 is the probability the ith case experiences the event of interest;

𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 is the value of the unobserved continuous variable for the ith case;

𝐹𝐹 is the link function;

c is the natural response rate.
In a probit model, the value of 𝛽𝛽X is taken to be the z-value of a normal

distribution. The estimated curve is an S-shaped cumulative normal distribution, and
the inverse standard normal distribution of the probability is modeled as a linear
combination of the predictors. The model also assumes that Z is linearly related to the
predictors. The functional form for the probit model can be derived from a latent
variable model:
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥2 + 𝜀𝜀
1
y𝑖𝑖 = �
0

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ > τ
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ τ

(5.2)

Certification= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅/ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1/ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀

We can think of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ as the underlying latent propensity that y=1, for the binary

variable, certified/not certified, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ is the propensity for certified and τ is the threshold,
which is 0 in this study. Since latent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ is unobserved, we do not know the

distribution of the errors, ε. In order to use ML, we make an assumption that the
distribution of the error is normally distributed.
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5.2 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable Problems
For the purpose of our study, we sought to design a model to test the impact of
food recalls on third-party certification. We recognize that the predictive power of the
recall dummy may be explained by unobserved factors, such as firm quality
management, which may affect both the occurrence of a recall and certification
adoption. Firms have a higher likelihood of producing poor quality products, which
may cause the recall; at the same time, they may also have a higher likelihood of
applying for TPC in order to improve management. Thus, if a binary probit model is
used, we will have an inconsistent estimation for the estimated coefficient of recall.
To overcome potential endogeneity issues and achieve an unbiased and consistent
estimator ofβbased on the exogenous assumption, we propose one instrumental
variable (IV) for the recall dummy: companies’ recall history. This IV, although
found to be closely related to the recall dummy, should not be correlated with
unobservable factors contributing to certification.
It is generally acknowledged that if regression models do not take endogeneity
into account, significantly biased results may ensue. Since most social science
disciplines often rely on non-experimental data, endogenous variables are a very
common and important problem (Arendt, and Holm, 2006). Maddala (1983, p. 122)
considers a two-equation probit model, in which the disturbances are correlated and
the binary dependent variable of the first equation is an endogenous regressor in the
second equation. He states that the parameters of the second equation are not
identified if there are no exclusion restrictions on the exogenous variables. This twostage approach has the advantage of incorporating the predicted recall into the probit
model as it represents the portion of recall activities related to certification adoption.
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5.3 Probit Model with a Binary Endogenous Explanatory Variable and the
Endogeneity Hypothesis
We observe the following binary choice, y1, made by a food company such as
a meat producer, co-manufacturer, or re-packer: the company enrolls in a TPC or does
not. We denote these two choices by y1 = 0,1, respectively. We also observe the
binary result, y2, standing for the recall, where y2 = 1 if the company has a food recall
in the study period, and y2 = 0 otherwise. In this study, I use a binary probit model
that contains a single binary endogenous explanatory variable in addition to one
instrument and two exogenous explanatory variables. The model is:
∗
𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖
= 𝛼𝛼1 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑧𝑧2𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖

∗
𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖
= 𝜋𝜋1 𝑧𝑧1𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋2 𝑧𝑧2𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

y1𝑖𝑖 = �

1
0

y2𝑖𝑖 = �

where

1
0

∗
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖
>0
∗
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 ≤ 0

∗
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖
>0
∗
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 ≤ 0

yi∗ is still an unobserved latent variable;
𝑧𝑧1𝑖𝑖 is an instrument;

𝑧𝑧2𝑖𝑖 is a vector of determinants of the decision to enroll;
𝜋𝜋1 is a conformal vector of unknown parameters;

εi is a stochastic error term that I characterize below.
Model 2.1: Certification= 𝛼𝛼1 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝜋𝜋1 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝜋𝜋2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

Model 2.2: Certification= 𝛼𝛼1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
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(5.3)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 = 𝜋𝜋1 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝜋𝜋2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

Model 2.3: Certification = 𝛼𝛼1 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2 = 𝜋𝜋1 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝜋𝜋2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

In equation 5.3, (𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ) is independent and distributed as bivariate normal with

mean zero; each has unit variance, and ρ = Cov(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ). ρ (shown as Rho in result
tables) is the correlation parameter, which can be understood as the correlation

between the unobservable explanatory variables of the two equations. If ρ ≠ 0, then 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
∗
and 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖
are correlated, and probit estimation of equation (5.3) is inconsistent for

∗
are
𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛽𝛽1and is therefore endogenous. On the contrary, if ρ=0, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 and 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖

uncorrelated, this leads us to definite the hypothesis system as follows:
𝐻𝐻0 : ρ = 0
𝐻𝐻1 : ρ ≠ 0

(5.4)

The effect of 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 is often of primary interest, especially when 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 indicates

participation in some sort of program, which in this paper is the adoption of

certification. The first equation is a selection that uses the probit model and creates
the predicted probability of adoption certification of each subject in the sample. The
second statement is also a probit model to the predicted probability of
recall/class1/reason2. The purpose of this model is to estimate the probability that an
observation with food recall will adopt a third-party certification. The probit model
analyzes whether the sample company chose to certify. It transforms the sigmoid
dose-response curve to a straight line that can then be analyzed by regression, either
through least squares or maximum likelihood. For this study, we use the “qlim”
routine in SAS (SAS 9_4, 2016).
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We test the null hypothesis that all coefficients except that of the intercept are
statistically equal to zero. And we test three models in the same way, trying to
identify which recall element has the most significant impact on certification
adoption. In all three models, the dependent variable is whether the sample company
certified or not. The independent variables in the first probit model are RECALL,
BEFORE, and SALES. RECALL is the binary endogenous explanatory variable and
we use CLASS1and REASON2 instead of RECALL in second and third models,
respectively.

5.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Log Likelihood Function
The maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the parameters due to the
nonlinearity of the Probit model in 𝛽𝛽. When using the maximum likelihood estimation

method to estimate the parameter of the distribution model, the likelihood value can
be used to assess the fit of the distribution to the data set. The likelihood function is
the basis of the maximum likelihood estimation parameter estimation method.
Assume we have an independent random sample (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ), where i=1, 2, 3…, n from

the Bernoulli distribution with probability P(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽). The probability density function

of a Bernoulli random variable, x, is given by f (x)=𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 (1-p) 1-x, where x=0, 1 and p is
the probability of success. Collecting all n observations and assuming independence,
which gives the likelihood function, is:
𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽|𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥) = ∏𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 |𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽),

=∏𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽)1−𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,
=∏𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 [1 − P(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽)]1−𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 [P(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽)]𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 .
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(5.5)

The natural logarithm of the likelihood function is log-likelihood, which is more
convenient to work with. The log of L= 𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽|𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥) yields:

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝐿𝐿) = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1{𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ln 𝑃𝑃 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽) + (1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ) ln [1 − P(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽)]}.

(5.6)

It is then easy to show that the log-likelihoods for the probit model are as follows:
𝑛𝑛

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝐿𝐿) = �{𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ln 𝐹𝐹 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 𝛽𝛽) + (1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ) ln 𝐹𝐹 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 𝛽𝛽)]}

(5.7)

𝑖𝑖=1

The maximum likelihood parameter is found by taking the derivative of the loglikelihood equation (5.8), setting it to zero and then solving for the unknown
parameters; extending to the probit model, we find:
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖

𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1[
𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) =

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖

−𝑝𝑝

+ (1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ) 1−𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ] 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 .
𝑖𝑖

𝑦𝑦
𝑖𝑖−𝜙𝜙�𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽�
∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑇𝑇
𝜑𝜑(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 𝛽𝛽)𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 .
𝜙𝜙�𝑥𝑥 𝛽𝛽� ×[1−𝜙𝜙�𝑥𝑥 𝑇𝑇 𝛽𝛽�]
𝑖𝑖

(5.8)

𝑖𝑖

5.5 Marginal Effects
In the interpretation of a probit model, presenting marginal effects often brings
more information than just looking at coefficients. Since the variance of the
underlying latent variable (y*) is not identified and can differ across models,
comparing coefficients across models can be very misleading. The marginal effect of
a predictor is defined as the partial derivative of the event probability with respect to
the predictor and it measures the expected change in the response variable as a
function of the change in that predictor while other explanatory variables are held
constant.
The marginal effect is the slope of the line drawn along the tangent to the
fitted probability curve 𝜙𝜙(𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥) at the selected point holding all other
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variables constant. The binary probit main-effects model is 𝜙𝜙 −1 (𝑝𝑝) = ∑𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , where

𝜙𝜙 −1 is the inverse of the cumulative normal distribution function. The marginal effect
of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 in the probit model is equal to φ(𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , where φ(𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽)is the density function
of the standard normal distribution evaluated at 𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽, 𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽 is the product of the row
vector of chosen covariate values, 𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 , and the column vector of parameter
estimates, 𝛽𝛽, and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is the parameter estimate for 𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖 .
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, in order to investigate the role of food recall and net sales
factors that influence the adoption of third-party certification, we report the maximum
likelihood estimates from probit models without IV (Tables 6.1) to compare them
with probit models with IV (Table 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3). The log likelihood of each
model is also provided in that model’s table. Marginal effects and predicted
probabilities are shown in Table 6.3.

6.1 Binary Probit Model without Using an Instrument
In this section, we estimate the probability of a firm having a TPC by using a
probit model without an instrumental variable.
Across these three models, a firm’s annual net sales are significant to its
decision of whether or not to obtain certification. However, the impacts of recall
variables differ. Our results show that if the firm had a food recall, then there was a
significant impact on the company’s decision about certification adoption; if the recall
was Class I, it is not significant at all; and if the recall happened for Reason 2, it has a
significant influence on a company’s decision at a 5% significance level.
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Table 6.1 Binary Probit Model (N=241)
Dependent Variable: Certification
Model 1

Variable

Model 3

Recall

Sales

Class1

Sales

Reason2

Sales

(𝛽𝛽1 )

(𝛽𝛽2)

(𝛽𝛽1 )

(𝛽𝛽2 )

(𝛽𝛽1 )

(𝛽𝛽2 )

0.612

0.006

***

***

0.219

0.002

0.007

0.766

0.006

***

**

***

0.002

0.318

0.002

0.183

Coef

S.E.

Model 2

0.254

Log
-85.65

-89.30

-86.76

0.16

0.12

0.15

likelihood
McFadde
n LRI
(R2)
Note: Asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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6.2 Probit Model with a Binary Endogenous Explanatory Variable
The results presented in Table 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 are drawn from three
probit models with the same IV, and have different binary endogenous explanatory
variables, which are RECALL, CLASS1 and REASON2, respectively. Table 6.2.1
includes sales and whether the firm had a recall or not within the study period to
predict the influence of each variable on the firm’s TPC adoption decision. Model 2
includes recall sales and Class I, while Model 3 uses sales and recall reason group 2
instead.
First of all, recall variables RECALL, CLASS1, and REASON2 are
statistically significant. All have a marked impact on firms’ third-party certification
adoption. Results from three models indicate that firms recently having recall cases
and being recalled in Class I and/or Reason 2 are more likely to apply for
certification. In Model 1, firms’ net yearly sales are somewhat insignificant to
certification adoption, while in Model 2 and 3 they are significant at the 5%
significance level, which suggests that net sales have a positive effect on certification
adoption. Companies with large net sales tend to certify more than do low-net-sale
companies.
Regarding the recall equation, a company’s recall history from 2009 to 2014,
variable BEFORE, has notable influence on whether the company has recalled in the
study period at the 5% significance level in Model 1, indicating that companies with a
recall history are more likely to continue having recalls in the current period.
Company recall history is also significant at the 5% significance level to recall Class I
in Model 2 and at the 1% significance level to recall Reason 2 in Model 3. This means
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that current year and past Class I recalls are correlated, as is the case with Reason 2
recalls.
Yearly net sales have a different impact on endogenous explanatory variables
in these three models. Sales have a significant influence on whether or not the
company has recalled in the study period at the 1% significance level, and also have
an influence on whether the recall happened for Reason 2 at the 10% significance
level. It is not, however, significant to recall class, which means the annual net sales
have varied impact on a firm’s recall variables.
Output includes the following table of parameter estimates. The endogenous
dummy coefficient (certification. recall/ certification. class1 and certification.
reason2) and the correlation coefficient (Rho) in each model have a central role in the
inference. The parameter estimates for these endogenous explanatory variables
indicate a strong effect of the recall variables on certification adoption (p <. 0001).
Rho parameter estimates, at the end of each results table, is the correlation of the error
terms from the two equations. The default value of Rho, 0, means the responses are
∗
uncorrelated, hereby making 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖
a standard probit model. Rho parameters in these

three models are obtained as -0.781, -0.810, and -0.779 respectively, and all are
significant at the 1% significance level, indicating that certification adoption is

correlated with recall variables and that Equation 5.3 cannot be replaced by a standard
probit model. This justifies the use of the instrument method.
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Table 6.2.1 Probit Estimates of Recall on Certification Adoption
Dependent Variable: Certification
Variable

Coef

S.E.

Certification_recall (𝛼𝛼1 )

1.851***

0.469

Certification_sales (𝛽𝛽1)

0.002

0.002

Recall_before (𝜋𝜋1 )

0.601**

0.252

Recall_sales (𝜋𝜋2 )

0.010***

0.003

Rho

-0.781***

0.249

Number of observations: 241
Endogenous Variable: Recall
Log likelihood value: -203.25
Note: Asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table 6.2.2 Probit Estimates of Recall Class I on Certification Adoption
Dependent Variable: Certification
Variable

Coef

S.E.

Certification_class1 (𝛼𝛼1 )

1.700 ***

0.550

Certification_sales (𝛽𝛽1)

0.005 **

0.002

Class1_before (𝜋𝜋1 )

0.550 **

0.237

Class1_sales (𝜋𝜋2 )

0.0001

0.0001

Rho

-0.810 ***

0.216

Number of observations: 241
Endogenous Variable: Class1
Log likelihood value: -224.01
Note: Asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table 6.2.3 Probit Estimates of Recall Reason 2 on Certification Adoption
Dependent Variable: Certification
Variable

Coef

S.E.

Certification_reason2 (𝛼𝛼1 )

2.317***

0.648

Certification_sales (𝛽𝛽1)

0.005**

0.002

Reason2_before (𝜋𝜋1 )

0.369***

0.124

Reason2_sales (𝜋𝜋2 )

0.0002*

0.0001

Rho

-0.779***

0.281

Number of observations: 241
Endogenous Variable: Reseason2
Log likelihood value: -156.09
Note: Asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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6.3 Marginal Effects
From Table 6.3 below, we observe that once a recall occurs, a firm's
probability to seek certification will increase by 36.37%. If the recall was a Class I
recall, the firm's probability of becoming certified will go up by 34.32%. The
situation that most increases a company’s likelihood of applying for certification, at
40.30%, is when the firm has a food recall for Reason 2.
If a company has a recall history from 2009 to 2014, no matter the number of
recalls, its probability of having a recall during the study period increases by 19.86%.
The probability of this company having a recent Class I or Reason 2 recall increases
by 14.69% and 5.7% respectively. These results indicate that once a food company
has a recall record, the probability of this company having food recalls again
increases.
In the above three models, if the average yearly net sales of a firm increases
by one unit (one million dollars, in this study), the probability of the firm becoming
certified increases by less than 0.1%. We observe that a limited improvement in
annual net sales entails an unremarkable impact on certification adoption. Moreover,
an increase in average yearly net sales does not increase a company’s likelihood of
having a food recall.
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Table 6.3 Marginal Effects of Recall Elements on Certification Adoption
Variable

Estimated Marginal

Predicted probabilities

Effects
Model 1 (Endogenous Variable: Recall)
Certification_recall(𝛼𝛼1 )

0.3637

Certification: 0.2462

Certification_sales(𝛽𝛽1)

0.0004

Recall: 0.3364

Recall_before(𝜋𝜋1 )

0.1986

Recall_sales(𝜋𝜋2 )

0.0032
Model 2 (Endogenous Variable: Class1)

Certification_class1(𝛼𝛼1 )

0.3432

Certification: 0.2179

Certification_sales(𝛽𝛽1)

0.0010

Class1: 0.1963

Class1_before(𝜋𝜋1 )

0.1469

Class1_sales(𝜋𝜋2 )

0.00003
Model 3 (Endogenous Variable: Reason2)

Certification_reason2(𝛼𝛼1 )

0.4030

Certification: 0.1782

Certification_sales(𝛽𝛽1)

0.0009

Class1: 0.0925

Reason2_before(𝜋𝜋1 )

0.057

Reason2_sales(𝜋𝜋2 )

0.00003
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Concluding Discussion
In this paper, we propose a binary probit model to analyze the relationship
between current recalls and certification adoption, while also controlling for the
endogeneity of the recall variable. This econometric framework enables us to control
the self-selection bias and other forms of unobserved endogeneity problems. Using
firm level of annual net sales and recall information, we obtain marginal effects
allowing us to explore how a firm’s probability of becoming certified changes with
different recall variables. We found that if a company in the U.S. meat product
industry had a food recall between January 1, 2015 and February 18, 2016, there was
a significant positive effect on the company’s decision regarding third-party
certification adoption. Similar results hold for companies that issued Class I and
Reason 2 recalls. Both of these variables may cause health hazard situations, which
can then cause health problems, death or large-scale food safety problems. Once a
recall occurs, a firm’s probability of becoming certified increases by 36.37%. As for
Class I and Reason 2 recalls happening, the firm's probability of becoming certified
increases by 34.32% and 40%, respectively.
Furthermore, a company with larger yearly net sales has a stronger preference
for applying TPC than low-net-sale companies. However, the improvement of firms’
net sales does not generate an equivalent increase in certification adoption, as was
initially expected. If a firm’s average yearly net sales increase by one million dollars,
the probability of the firm becoming certified only increases about 0.1%. Moreover,
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companies with a previous food recall record are more likely to have recent recall
issues.
These results highly suggest that firms with recent recall cases, especially
recalls caused by the threat of foodborne illnesses, tend to be more likely to apply for
certification. Successful third-party certifications monitor and enforce standards and
prevent firms from producing poor quality and/or unsafe products, which may lead to
foodborne pathogens. Certification would likely help firms regain lost market shares
and rebuild consumer confidence in product safety. Moreover, firms with TPC have a
competitive advantage and better access to global agro-food systems. Thus,
certification might be one of the best options for recovery after food recall incidents.

7.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
This empirical study is limited in that the data do not provide details on
registration time or adoption with specific certification bodies and auditors. This
study is also constrained by limited company information. These limitations could be
addressed in further research through the use of case studies and increased sample
sizes to supplement the statistical company data. A better perspective could then be
gained on how food recalls affect TPC adoption, as well as how this might affect food
recalls by controlling for other motives that influencing companies’ decisions. And
with companies’ TPC adoption records, in further study we can also discus how TPC
adoption influences recall occurrence. These topics are both important and can shed
light on the strategic relevance and economic value of TPC to companies with recalls
and the impact of TPC on subsequent recalls.
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APPENDIX

Appendix: SAS Codes
Descriptive Statistics
data qlim2; set qlim;
if num=0 then recall=0; else recall=1;
if class=1 then class1=1; else class1=0;
if reason=2 then reason2=1; else reason2=0;
sales2=sales/1000000;
run;
/*mean*/
proc means data =qlim2;
var employees sales weight;
run;
/*frequency*/
proc freq data = qlim2;
table num recall before class1 reason2 certificate;
run;
Binary Probit Model
/*Model 6.1.1*/
proc qlim data=qlim2;
model certificate=recall Sales2/ discrete;
run;
/*Model 6.1.2*/
proc qlim data=qlim2;
model certificate=class1 Sales2/ discrete;
run;
/*Model 6.1.3*/
proc qlim data=qlim2;
model certificate=reason2 Sales2/ discrete;
run;
Binary Probit Model with IV and Marginal Effect
/*Model 6.2.1*/
proc qlim data=qlim2;
model certificate=recall Sales2/ discrete;
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model recall=before sales2/ discrete;
output out=outqlim1 marginal proball;
run;
proc means data=outqlim1 n mean;
var Meff_P2_certificate_recall Meff_P2_certificate_sales2 Meff_P2_recall_before
Meff_P2_recall_sales2 Prob2_certificate Prob2_recall;
title 'Average of the Individual Marginal Effects 1';
run;
/*Model 6.2.2*/
proc qlim data=qlim2;
model certificate=class1 Sales/ discrete;
model class1=before sales/ discrete;
output out=outqlim2 marginal proball;
run;
proc means data=outqlim2 n mean;
var Meff_P2_certificate_class1 Meff_P2_certificate_sales2
Meff_P2_class1_before Meff_P2_class1_sales2
Prob2_certificate Prob2_class1;
title 'Average of the Individual Marginal Effects 2';
run;
/*Model 6.2.3*/
proc qlim data=qlim2;
model certificate=reason2 Sales/ discrete;
model reason2=before sales/ discrete;
output out=outqlim3 marginal proball;
run;
proc means data=outqlim3 n mean;
var Meff_P2_certificate_reason2 Meff_P2_certificate_sales2
Meff_P2_reason2_before Meff_P2_reason2_sales2
Prob2_certificate Prob2_reason2;
title 'Average of the Individual Marginal Effects 3';
run;
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